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As NATO has returned its focus to collective defence since 2014, very short, short-range and 
medium-range surface-based air defence has become a desirable capability. Germany, which 
has been recalibrating the Bundeswehr to resume participation in conventional military 
conflicts, is in the process of re-creating air defence capabilities. In 2018–2019, the German 
Defence Ministry is expected to take decisions regarding two crucial air defence programmes: 
the NNbS and the TLVS. 
The very short and short-range air defence capabilities have effectively been dismantled with-
in the German Army over the last decade. The Bundeswehr plans to rebuild them in the NNbS 
programme in order to meet its commitments within the NATO Defence Planning Process 
(NDPP). The contract for the NNbS is expected to be signed in 2019. However, the plans to 
quickly rebuild capabilities in this area may stumble on technical, financial and personnel chal-
lenges. As Germany has committed to deploy a fully modernised brigade for NATO Very High 
Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) duty in 2023, Berlin is also seeking alternative solutions, such 
as co-operation with The Netherlands, or smaller purchases outside the NNbS programme. 
In late 2018 or early 2019, the German Defence Ministry is also planning to sign the contract 
for the medium-range air defence programme, TLVS, three years after it decided to use the 
results of the MEADS programme that was completed in 2014. The TLVS system will replace 
the Patriot batteries that have been in use since the late 1980s and have been successively 
upgraded. Time will tell as to whether the lengthy negotiations will enable the Defence Min-
istry to avoid delays and financial and technical problems in the complex TLVS programme, 
of which Germany is going to be the sole user for now.  
Very short and short-range air defence: 
rebuilding capabilities
(1) Today: minimal capabilities of the Bundes- 
wehr. The German armed forces currently have 
very limited capabilities when it comes to very 
short and short-range air defence. The Air 
Force’s sole air defence missile wing has only 
one air defence missile group equipped with 
these kind of systems (see the map). It has four 
stationary MANTIS systems to protect military 
bases against RAM threats (rocket, artillery 
and mortar attacks) and, most probably, one 
LeFlaSys Ozelot battery (three platoons with 
Wiesel 2 vehicles equipped with Stinger launch-
ers) to protect mobile forces.1 In the absence of 
a successor system, the service life of the Le-
FlaSys Ozelot system has been extended to 2025 
(it was originally due to expire in 2018). 
Such limited capabilities are the fallout of the 
Bundeswehr reforms and changing assess-
1 Leichtes Flugabwehrsystem (LeFlaSys) – light air defence 
system.
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ments of the security environment over the 
last two decades. The very short and short-
range air defence systems dating back to the 
Cold War era were gradually decommissioned: 
Roland in 2005 and Gepard in 2010. In 2007, 
Germany decided to implement a new air de-
fence system, the System Flugabwehr or SysFla, 
mainly for the purpose of crisis-management 
operations abroad. In the first phase of the 
SysFla programme, the objective was to create 
a stationary system for the protection of mil-
itary bases – against both asymmetric (RAM) 
and symmetric threats (aircraft, helicopters, 
drones and cruise missiles). In the second and 
third phase, the aim of the SysFla programme 
was to purchase mobile platforms integrated 
with weapon station to counter RAM missiles 
and missile launchers2 for short-range air de-
fence to protect mobile forces. However, only 
the first phase of the programme was imple-
mented, and only four stationary C-RAM sys-
tems were  acquired. This was due to the cuts 
that the Bundeswehr experienced after 2011, as 
well as to the perceived absence of any conven-
tional threat, and to growing scepticism about 
high-intensity crisis-management operations. 
Moreover, all surface-based air defence systems 
previously located within the structures of the 
German Army were integrated into the German 
Air Force in 2012. 
(2) Ambitious plans: meeting NATO require-
ments. As NATO has been refocusing on build-
ing up its collective defence since 2014, and in 
2 For more information, see: J. Gotkowska, The cur-
rent state, problems and future of Germany’s air and 
missile defence, ‘OSW Commentary’, 10.04.2013, 
https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commen-
tary/2013-04-10/current-state-problems-and-future-
germanys-air-and-missile
view of the new defence planning guidelines, 
very short and short-range air defence has 
been identified as a capability which the Alli-
ance lacks. After a period of drastic reductions 
of these kind of systems over the last two dec-
ades, most allies are currently rebuilding their 
potential in this regard. Germany is very much 
amongst the laggards and needs to catch up 
quickly. According to some media reports, 
Germany is going to need around 20 batteries 
of very short and short-range air defence to 
protect the brigades and headquarters which 
Berlin has identified as part of NATO Defence 
Planning Process.3 Other sources mention 
14 batteries.4
In April 2018, work was completed on the tac-
tical and technical requirements for the Bun-
deswehr’s new very short and short-range 
air defence programme, the NNbS (Nah- und 
Nächstbereichsschutz). In 2018, Germany plans 
to commence tests of the systems available on 
the market. In 2019, the Defence Ministry will 
receive the Army’s proposals for potential solu-
tions and make its purchasing decision. Accord-
ing to the plans, the initial units should become 
operational in the years 2023–2026, in time to 
protect some of the brigades and headquarters 
identified within the NDPP. In the programme’s 
second phase, i.e. to 2032, all the brigades and 
headquarters will get very short and short-
range air defence protection. According to me-
dia reports, full implementation of the NNbS 
programme would cost around 2 billion euros.5 
The German-French MBDA Group, which has 
offered the French Mistral 3 missiles for very 
short-range air defence (range up to 6 km, al-
titude to 4.5 km) on wheeled platforms, might 
3 A. Shalal, German general sees closer missile defense 
ties with Dutch, Reuters, 29.03.2018,
https://mobile.reuters.com/article/amp/idUSKBN1H52AL
4 L . Hoffmann, Bodengebundene Luftverteidigung, ‘Euro- 
päische Sicherheit & Technik‘, No 4/2018, April 2018.
5 A. Shalal, Germany to move ahead on new short-range 
air defense system, Reuters, 02.02.2017, https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-germany-military/germany-to-
move-ahead-on-new-short-range-air-defense-system-
idUSKBN15H1Z9 
The Bundeswehr’s current very short and 
short-range air defence capabilities are 
very limited.
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be one of the programme’s contractors. MBDA 
has also suggested integrating into the NNbS 
programme the IRIS-T SL missiles and launch-
ers made by Diehl Defence for short-range air 
defence (range to 40 km, altitude to 20 km) on 
wheeled or tracked platforms. Moreover, MBDA 
has been developing laser weapon systems, 
which the German Defence Ministry wishes to 
integrate into the NNbS programme at a later 
date.6 Rheinmetall, too, has offered the Bundes- 
wehr its solutions for the NNbS programme, 
but without making public any detailed infor-
mation about the offer.7
(3) Rapid development of capabilities sup-
ported by co-operation with The Nether-
lands. Irrespective of the above long-term plans, 
the Bundeswehr is looking for ways to expand 
its very short and short-range air defence ca-
pabilities in the short term. Germany has com-
mitted to deploying a fully modernised brigade 
for NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task Force 
(VJTF) duty in 2023.8 This means that its mo-
bile troops need air defence protection against 
drones, low-flying helicopters and aircraft. For 
this reason, the Germany Army has been devel-
oping a smaller project known as ‘qualified air 
defence’ – in addition to the NNbS programme 
and independently of the Air Force.9 By 2023, 
6 MBDA, Wie realistisch ist vernetzter Schutz im Nah- und 
Nächstbereich?, ‘Europäische Sicherheit & Technik’, April 
2018, p. 22–24.
7 Rheinmetall, Rheinmetall presents its future orient-
ed concept for ground-based air defence, 22.03.2018, 
https: //www.rheinmetall -defence.com/en/rhein-
metall_defence/public_relations/news/latest_news/in-
dex_16576.php 
8 Germany has committed three divisions to the NDPP. 
Because of shortcomings regarding arms and military 
equipment as well as readiness levels, the German Army 
proposed an army equipment plan (Project Land 2023). 
As part of the plan, one division is to be fully modern-
ised by 2027, and the other two – by 2032. By 2023, 
a brigade equivalent is to be fully modernised and to 
achieve full operational readiness, in time for Germany’s 
participation as framework nation in the VJTF in 2023. 
S. Schulte, German Army proposes Project Land 2023 
equipment plan, Jane’s 360, 11.04.2018, http://www.
janes.com/article/79195/german-army-proposes-pro-
ject-land-2023-equipment-plan 
9 L. Hoffmann, Qualifizierte Fliegerabwehr soll Drohnen 
im Nächstbereich ausschalten, ‘Europäische Sicherheit & 
Technik’, January 2018, p. 63–64.
it wants to have around 12 base vehicles (plus 
surveillance and command and control vehi-
cles) equipped with a 30–40 mm automatic 
gun for air defence protection for the German 
units on VJTF duty. The ‘qualified air defence’ 
project currently covers a single brigade but, 
according to the Army’s long-term plans, every 
combat battalion should include an air defence 
platoon of this kind. There has been media talk 
of integrating the Boxer armoured fighting ve-
hicle with different weapon stations (e.g. made 
by Rheinmetall or Kongsberg) and potential use 
of Airburst munitions.10 
The German Air Force has also started air defence 
co-operation with the Royal Netherlands Army 
as part of the Apollo project launched in 2016.11 
It adds to the existing co-operation between the 
two countries’ land forces, which includes, in-
ter alia, the affiliation of two of the three Dutch 
brigades to German divisions, the binational 
1 German/Netherlands Corps’ headquarters and 
joint participation in the VJTF rotation and in 
the NATO battlegroup in Lithuania. The Apollo 
project envisages long-term and wide-ranging 
German-Dutch co-operation on air defence. 
What is particularly important from the point of 
view of current needs is that the project will also 
help the Bundeswehr complement its capabil-
10 T. Wiegold, Rheinmetall macht Druck: Entscheidung für 
mobile Flugabwehr für VJTF 2023 soll schnell fallen, Au-
gen geradeaus!, 15.03.2018, http://augengeradeaus.
net/2018/03/rheinmetall-macht-druck-entscheidung-fuer-
mobile-flugabwehr-fuer-vjtf-2023-soll-schnell-fallen/ 
11 The Apollo project focuses on six issues: (1) develop-
ment of joint doctrines, (2) creation of a binational Air & 
Missile Defence Academy, (3) co-ordination of procure-
ment, (4) creation of a joint Binational Air & Missile De-
fence Task Force, (5) creation of a joint Binational Short 
Range Air Defence Task Force, (6) building joint com-
mand and control capabilities. See: Gemeinsame Flug-
abwehr: Niederländisches Kommando führt deutsche 
Soldaten, 4.04.2018, https://www.bundeswehr.de 
The contract for the NNbS very short and 
short-range air defence system is expect-
ed to be signed in 2019. 
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ities in the short term. A bilateral very short 
and short-range air defence task force will be 
created as part of the project. Moreover, in 
April 2018, German Air Defence Missile Group 
61 equipped with MANTIS and LeFlaSys Ozelot 
batteries was placed under the Defence Ground 
Based Air Defence Command in the structures 
of the Royal Netherlands Army. 
The Netherlands currently has greater potential 
in terms of very short and short-range air de-
fence than Germany: the Dutch Army Ground 
Based Air Defence System includes 18 Fen-
nek vehicles with Stinger launchers and two 
NASAMS batteries.12 The affiliation of the Ger-
man air defence missile group under Dutch com-
mand will not fundamentally alter its position in 
the chain of command of the German Air Force. 
However, it is expected to facilitate joint training 
and exercises with the Dutch units and enable 
a joint deployment in NATO’s framework.13 The 
aim is for the joint task force to reach full oper-
ating capability in time to participate in the VJTF 
in 2023. The Netherlands will most likely take 
part in VJTF 2023 with a mechanised infantry 
battalion among other units, as for VJTF 2015 
and VJTF 2019. In the future, the German-Dutch 
task force may complement the capabilities of 
the NATO battlegroup in Lithuania as an air de-
fence component. Germany is the battlegroup’s 
framework nation (with around 700 troops cur-
rently); The Netherlands deployed a reinforced 
mechanised company (around 250 troops) to 
Lithuania in 2017 and 2018.
12 Ministerie van Defensie, Army Ground Based Air De-
fence System, 18.04.2018, https://www.defensie.nl/on-
derwerpen/materieel/bewapening/army-ground-based-
air-defence-system-agbads 
13 Bodengebundene Luftverteidigung: Von Kooperation 
zu Integration, 5.04.2018, www.bundeswehr.de
(4) Challenges. Representatives of the German 
Air Force point to significant risks facing the 
NNbS programme. Firstly, the time for making 
decisions is short (the plan is to sign the contract 
as soon as 2019), and the selected contractor 
will also have to implement the programme’s 
first phase within a short period (2023–2026). 
Secondly, the assumption is that in the first 
phase, solutions available on the market will 
be acquired, which may mean that not all of 
the Bundeswehr’s technical requirements will 
be met. Thirdly, financing the programme may 
be problematic: with a total cost of 2 billion euros, 
the NNbS will probably require an additional 
increase of the defence budget in the coming 
years. It remains to be seen if that is going 
to be feasible politically. And finally, it will be 
a daunting challenge to train troops within such 
a short timeframe. By effectively dismantling 
very short and short-range air defence within 
the Bundeswehr, and moving the residual capa-
bilities from the Army to the Air Force, Germa-
ny lost the personnel that had knowledge and 
experience in this sphere. It has been argued 
that rebuilding this potential may take 5 to 
10 years. In view of the German Army’s difficul-
ties in attracting personnel with technical skills, 
this may become a major soft spot.
Medium-range air defence: protracted 
TLVS negotiations
(1) Today: modernised Patriots and the TLVS 
in negotiations. The German Air Force cur-
rently has one test and thirteen operational 
batteries of medium-range air defence Patriot 
system, upgraded to PAC-3 version with PAC-2 
and PAC-3 CRI missiles. Their service life was in-
itially planned to end around 2025 but will be 
extended to 2030. 
In 2005, Germany (MBDA Deutschland), the 
United States (Lockheed Martin) and Italy 
(MBDA Italia) established the MEADS pro-
gramme to develop a new medium-range air 
defence system. Eight batteries of the new sys-
tem were expected to have replaced the Patriot 
The efforts to quickly rebuild Germany’s 
very short and short-range air defence 
capabilities will face financial, technolog-
ical and personnel difficulties.
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batteries by 2018. The MEADS was to be inte-
grated with Germany’s short-range IRIS-T SL air 
defence system (range to 40 km, altitude to 20 
km) in order to reduce operational costs, since 
the PAC-3 MSE missiles are quite expensive. 
In 2011, the US withdrew from MEADS, but the 
programme continued until a prototype was 
ready in 2014. Germany chose not to buy the 
system in isolation but in June 2015 it decid-
ed to use the R&D results of the MEADS and 
IRIS-T SL programmes to build a German me-
dium-range air defence system, the so-called 
TLVS (Taktisches Luftverteidigungssystem), 
while making a reservation that the contrac-
tor would have to meet certain conditions.14 
For now, Germany is the only state interested 
in a MEADS based system: France and Italy use 
the SAMP/T system, and Poland, Sweden and 
Romania have opted for the Patriot system 
(in different configurations).
The contract for the development of the TLVS 
and acquisition of the first batteries was ex-
pected to be signed after negotiations with 
the selected bidder (MBDA Deutschland). Then 
financing for the programme was to be author-
ised by the Bundestag. However, the negotia-
tions process took longer than planned. In Sep-
tember 2016, MBDA Deutschland, the German 
subsidiary of the MBDA Group, presented its 
first offer to the Federal Office of Bundeswehr 
Equipment (BAAINBw) after a delay of several 
months. The stated reason concerned problems 
in co-operation with the US partners, including 
14 German Defence Ministry’s reports on armaments pol-
icy, 2015–2018, https://www.bmvg.de/de/themen/ru-
estung/ruestungsmanagement/ruestungsbericht 
Lockheed Martin.15 Because of these difficul-
ties, MBDA Deutschland was asked to prepare 
studies of possible risks and alternative solu-
tions for individual modules of the TLVS, includ-
ing the exciter in the multifunction fire control 
radar, the surveillance radar and the medium 
range radar (interoperable with the IRIS-T SL).16
The offer submitted by MBDA Deutschland 
was supplemented in May 2017 and the formal 
negotiations process was started. At the same 
time the German Defence Minister, Ursula von 
der Leyen, announced that the contract for 
TLVS would not be signed in 2017 as previously 
planned. The reasons concerned reservations 
as to the costs and schedules, and doubts as 
to whether a relatively small German subsidiary 
of the MBDA Group would be able to shoulder 
such a complex armaments programme. For this 
reason, in March 2018 MBDA Deutschland and 
Lockheed Martin created the TLVS GmbH joint 
venture (taking 60% and 40% stakes, respec-
tively), which is going to be the programme’s 
main contractor.17 
(2) Upcoming decisions and challenges. 
The most recent armaments policy report re-
leased by the German Defence Ministry in May 
2018, states that the main bidder (currently 
TLVS GmbH) will likely submit a second offer 
in spring 2018 and that the draft contract will 
probably be signed by the end of 2018.18 This 
would be followed in early 2019 by a parlia-
mentary endorsement procedure. According 
15 T. Wiegold, Industrie legt Angebot für neues Luftvertei-
digungssystem vor, Augen Geradeaus!, 29.09.2016, 
http://augengeradeaus.net/2016/09/industrie-legt-an-
gebot-fuer-neues-luftverteidigungssystem-vor/ 
16 L. Hoffmann, MBDA Deutschland hat Angebot ab-
gegeben, ‘Der Monitor für Defence und Sicherheit-
spolitik’, 29.09.2018, https://www.hartpunkt.de/mb-
da-deutschland-hat-angebot-abgegeben/ 
17 A. Shalal, S. Siebold, MBDA and Lockheed form joint 
venture for German missile defense project, Reuters, 
8.03.2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germa-
ny-military-meads/mbda-and-lockheed-form-joint-ven-
ture-for-german-missile-defense-project-idUSKCN1G-
K12O 
18 7. Bericht des Bundesministeriums der Verteidigung zu 
Rüstungsangelegenheiten, October 2015, https://www.
bmvg.de/de/themen/ruestung/ruestungsmanagement/
ruestungsbericht
In June 2015, Germany decided to use 
the results of the trilateral MEADS pro-
gramme to build a German medium-range 
air defence system, the TLVS. 
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to the plans, the first TLVS batteries would be 
delivered in 2025. It is still unclear as to which 
multifunction fire control radar, surveillance 
radar and medium range radar will be chosen. 
It is certain, however, that the TLVS system will 
include PAC-3 MSE and IRIS-T SL missiles and 
launchers, in addition to the BMC4IS Tactical 
Operation Center. It cannot be ruled out that 
the planned deadlines for the Defence Minis-
try’s decision and for the programme imple-
mentation will be postponed yet again. 
The cost of the TLVS programme was initially 
estimated at around 4 billion euros but, ac-
cording to unofficial reports, it may be twice 
as high.19 Added to this should be the cost 
of the MEADS programme development, i.e. 
around 3.5 billion euros, of which Germany 
covered around a quarter. The rising cost of the 
MEADS-based TLVS programme is seen as an 
opportunity by competitors. In early 2017, US 
company Raytheon signed an agreement with 
German Rheinmetall on co-operation in areas 
including air defence. In March 2018, the two 
companies presented a comprehensive offer to 
the German Defence Ministry, concerning very 
short and short-range as well as medium-range 
air defence systems, and stepped up lobbying 
activities among the military and members of 
parliament. For the medium-range air defence 
programme, the proposed solution is to grad-
ually upgrade Germany’s Patriot batteries to 
Patriot NextGen standard, if the Defence Min-
istry decides to end co-operation with MBDA 
Deutschland and Lockheed Martin.20 While that 
is unlikely, it cannot be ruled out entirely be-
cause the TLVS contract will include a clause 
enabling Germany to withdraw from the pro-
gramme if the costs increase significantly. 
19 A. Shalal, S. Siebold, Exclusive: Proposed German mis-
sile defense system cost far above estimates – sources, 
Reuters, 17.10.2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-germany-meads-exclusive/exclusive-proposed-ger-
man-missile -defense-system-cost-far-above-esti-
mates-sources-idUSKBN12H248
20 See footnote 7. 
The German Defence Ministry has commis-
sioned studies to analyse the feasibility of inte-
grating the IRIS-T SL missiles and launchers with 
the Patriot system, which suggests it might po-
tentially use this option.21
Irrespective of the progress of the TLVS process, 
the Defence Ministry has taken steps to further 
upgrade Germany’s Patriot systems to the Con-
fig 3+ version. The process has already started 
and is expected to finish in 2023. Thus, the ser-
vice life of the Patriot batteries will be extended 
to 2030. Germany has also been co-operating 
with The Netherlands on the Patriot system. 
As part of the joint Apollo project, a Ger-
man-Dutch air & missile defence task force has 
been created and work is underway to enhance 
the interoperability of the German and Dutch 
Patriot units. The joint task force achieved initial 
operational capability in 2016. In the coming 
years, it is expected to achieve full operational 
capability, according to NATO standards, and 
may be deployed within the NATO framework. 
(3) TLVS – a test for the Defence Ministry. 
The TLVS programme will be a test for the new 
armaments project management model which 
the Defence Minister, Ursula von der Leyen, has 
been implementing since 2013. Her main objec-
tive since taking up the post of Defence Min-
ister has been to improve the transparency of 
procedures and make sure that the Ministry’s 
new procurement projects stay within their 
budgets and deadlines. The German Defence 
Ministry does not want to repeat the mistakes 
21 See footnote 4.
The German Defence Ministry expects 
that the TLVS GmbH joint venture will 
submit a second offer in 2018 and that the 
contract will be signed by the end of 2018 
or early 2019.
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of the previous large armaments programmes, 
such as the purchase of Airbus 400M trans-
port aircraft or the NH90 and Tiger helicopters, 
which were marred by constantly postponed 
delivery dates, rising costs and multiple de-
fects. The protracted negotiation process for 
the TLVS programme is intended to ensure 
a new quality in German armaments policy – of 
costs and deadlines that are adhered to. Time 
will show whether the German defence budget 
will be sufficient to start the TLVS programme 
and whether the lengthy negotiations will in-
deed prevent delays and financial and techni-
cal problems at later stages. It also remains to 
be seen whether the German TLVS system will 
have any export potential and what the mainte-
nance costs will be, assuming that Germany will 
remain its sole user for a longer time. 
Air Defence Missile Wing 1 (Flugabwehrraketengeschwader 1)
location of the subunits
MAP
Air Defence Missile Group 21 in Sanitz (Patriot batteries)
Air Defence Missile Group 24 in Bad Sülze (Patriot batteries)
Air Defence Missile Group 26 in Husum (Patriot batteries)
Air Defence Missile Group 61 in Todendorf/Panker (MANTIS and LeFlaSys batteries) 
BrandenburgLower Saxony
Bremen
Hamburg
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania
Schleswig-Holstein 
Todendorf/Panker
Sanitz Bad Sülze
Husum
